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Abstract – Profiling users for the purpose of targeted 
advertisements or other kinds of personalization is very 
popular on the internet. But besides the benefits of individually 
tailored news feeds and shopping recommendation research has 
shown that many users consider this practice as privacy 
infringement. Profiling is often conducted without consent and 
services offer neither information about what the profile looks 
like nor which effects it might have. In this paper we argue that 
understanding profiling and thus interacting with the resulting 
profiles fosters a privacy literacy that is necessary for users to 
stay autonomous in the information society. We analyze the 
extent of interest profiling by google and develop a counter-
measures that helps to obfuscate these profiles. To do so we 
analyzed a links lists from a social bookmarking service with 
regard to the interests they reveal. We found that, although the 
profiling by google is very unstable we can still use the 
information to obfuscate the profile. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Personalized recommendation and tailoring of information has 
become a widespread functionality to make services more effective 
and efficient. They are adopted by a broad range of online services 
from social networks to shopping websites. However, to achieve 
better personalization the services process more and more data 
about users who are often not aware of this. If this profiling takes 
place without explicit consent and in ways that are not transparent 
to users it is a threat to (informational) privacy. A recent study also 
showed that 55% of US internet users don't think that there is a fair 
trade-off between benefits and their privacy, although they 
regularly give their consent to this practices [1]. In most cases they 
do not have a sufficient understanding of what the assumed 
characteristics of their digital identities – also known as data 
doubles [2] - are, nor are there tools that effectively support this 
understanding [3]. While some see benefits in personalized 
recommendations most users just dislike and ignore common forms 
of online behavioral advertisement (OBA) [4], [5]. Several 
researches have addressed the negative side effects of profiling like 
discrimination [6], [7] or filter bubbles [8]. On a more general level 
the effects of tracking can also be described as a threat to the 
autonomy of internet users as privacy can be regarded as a 
mechanism to protect individuals' autonomy and control when 
using technical systems [9]. Tracking technology is not only used 
for delivering personalized ads but also to alter the content of 
websites [10]. Some even assume that it is used to alter prices to 
motivate customers in buying a product [11], [12]. This is on the 
one hand thought to anticipate the interests of users but on the other 
hand also fits the needs of service providers to increase sales or 
reduce risks. However, this can, in the end, result in an exclusion of 
participation e.g. when products are simply not offered to those that 
live in a specific region [13]. With the rising use of ad blockers now 
residing between 15 and 35% of all internet users [14] services are 
starting to prevent users from using this effective anti-profiling 
technique. They start to block ad blocker users [15] or circumvent 
them with new tracking techniques. In addition, blockers often 
reduce the functionality of a website and do not offer any means to 
understand the profiles that are built and the effects they have. 
A strategy to actively influence online tracking is known as 
obfuscation [16]. In contrast to blocking specific parts of websites 
obfuscation of web trails tries to hide the real interests of a user in 
dummy traffic and therefore obfuscates her profile. Obfuscation is 
especially useful when blocking of websites or parts of websites 
would limit the usefulness of a platform. So far obfuscation 
techniques were developed for specific settings like web search 
[17], [18], location based-services [19], recommender systems [20] 
and online social networks [21]. We extend this research by gaining 
knowledge about the profiles that are created by online trackers 
focusing not on the tracking itself but on common surfing behavior. 
We want to use this knowledge to empower users to control these 
profiles. More specifically, the contribution of this paper is 
i. an analysis of tracking and interest profiling 
performed by Google services on users who are not 
logged in based on authentic browsing histories and 
ii. using this information to create an informed Dummy 
Generation Strategy (DGS) [22] for profile obfuscation 
that influences profiles based on web navigation trails. 
In addition, we want to address the critique that the effect of 
theoretic obfuscation models is often not measurable when applied 
in a real world environment [16]. We demonstrate how the effect 
on the breadth of profiles created by Google can be evaluated. 
To measure effects of our strategies we created an automatic 
browsing process used to analyze 500 URL lists publicly posted by 
Reddit users. We made the extent and impact of interest profiling 
by Google visible. Google's servers follow users on 81% of their 
web history and extract 17 interests on average. The information 
provided by this study can be used to give feedback to users on how 
their interaction with an online service will influence the future of 
the user’s and others’ interactions with this service. Additionally, 
we also demonstrate that and how this influence can be controlled 
by the users through obfuscation 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first we will 
describe some perspectives on the discussion about profiling and 
the negative effects on users. Then we will present how we analyzed 
the extent of profiling by Google and the interest profiles it 
generates. The paper concludes with an evaluation of obfuscation 
based on the learned connection between interests and specific web 
sites. 
II. BACKGROUND 
One of the tracking providers, Acxiom, describes in a 
presentation how it not only targets users with personalized 
services, but also tries to influence them by offering discounts [23]. 
Advertising in this case takes it a step further, from trying to deliver 
(visual) information towards triggering a specific behavior by 
making assumptions about interests or shopping behavior based on 
a rather small set of information that is extracted from the browser 
while surfing the web. Similarly, a Facebook employee said 
regarding their reasons to build user profiles that they “[...] try to 
understand what kind of characteristics make someone likely to take 
a certain type of action. When [an advertiser] specifies a desired 
action – say registration or purchase – we look for users more likely 
to take that action.”[24] These assumptions may for example be that 
persons categorized as young and mobile males respond more often 
to discounts while those categorized as female and older do more 
often buy products that are offered with free shipping. 
In most cases this is only a problem when it comes to 
consuming and online shopping, but similar mechanisms are in 
place when information on news sites are tailored to assumed 
interests. Gillespie [25] argued that this effect, later coined the filter 
bubble [10], may lead to less comprehensive understanding of 
events, since one cannot decide which information source to trust 
when they are preselected by an algorithm. Automatic assumptions 
about characteristics are used to change which information is 
delivered and what options can be chosen is a threat to what Rössler 
named as decisional privacy [9]. 
Galloway [26] describes a feature of these mechanisms as 
cycles of anticipation (see Figure 11) since they do not operate on 
static data that is collected from the user once e.g. when profile 
information is entered voluntarily during registration. Instead, it 
relies on dynamic data that is continuously created by tracking 
millions of users. This information is then used to try to influence 
the individual and again collecting her behavior traces. In general, 
the feedback loop within online profiling does not care for the 
identity of the user. User characteristics are estimated based on 
traces like IP-based geo-location, browser settings and surf history. 
They are then enriched with data from other sources to which a user 
may never have contributed to individually. In these cases, the 
predicted behavior, especially if a user was influenced successfully, 
is more relevant than the actual characteristics of the user in the real 
world. In a feedback loop each action taken is itself an information 
that feeds back into the system which is used to choose the possible 
actions that are available in the next step. In this way of thinking 
                                                                
1 The model is based on the semi-structured modeling language 
SeeMe. Round elements represent roles, those with round edges 
activities and those with sharp edges resources. Arrow indicate 
relations and influences. 
the cybernetic hypothesis [27] every user is regarded as a black-box 
that can be regulated by the input (e.g. ads or discounts) and not as 
an autonomous person, for which the output has to be brought in 
line with the trackers' goal (e.g. conversion rate). In this system, 
every action of a user or of the responding algorithms provide 
feedback to each other [28]. The problem is that there is no direct 
option for a user to determine which of her actions – and to what 
extent – produce a specific reaction by the advertising delivery 
algorithm, whilst the algorithm is open to be influenced by its 
designers, e.g. to favor specific content and push a user in a specific 
direction. 
Although the problematic aspects of profiling have been 
discussed [29], [30] and users widely dislike these practices [4], [5], 
there is a lack of options for users in their daily action. Especially 
on the policy level there is currently no possibility to prevent 
profiling if the data used is anonymous or aggregated. Initiatives 
such as the DoNotTrack (DNT) HTTP-header lack wide spread 
adoption [31] and even are getting rejected by online advertisers. 
Opt-out options provided by advertising networks like AdChoices2 
only offer the possibility to end the personalization of ads but won't 
stop the tracking and profiling itself. From a legal perspective in 
most cases tracking users anonymously is considered to be in 
compliance with international law as long as a re-identification is 
not possible. 
A. Related Work on Online Tracking 
Online tracking occurs in various forms from which tracking 
with browser cookies is still the most common technology [32]. 
Besides simple implementation its outreach increases these days 
through the use of Social media plugins and Content Delivery 
Networks (CDN) that are included as third-party elements in many 
websites. In these cases, functionality on websites requires that 
scripts and/or images are requested from third party web servers 
which comes along with the transfer of a client-identifying (not 
person identifying) text string called cookie. However, because not 
all cookies are used for tracking purposes, they cannot be totally 
blocked. Cookies are important for managing sessions for users that 
logged into a server or to store preferences (e.g. to select a non-
default language). Countermeasures as to block third-party traffic 
and cookies is therefore difficult to implement without accidentally 
blocking essential parts of the web experience. In addition, other 
forms of third-party tracking are emerging that are ever more 
difficult to prevent (for example tracking with etags [33], various 
forms of zombie cookies [34] or combination of various Browser 
information known as fingerprinting [35]). 
The latter, believed to be a more theoretical possibility, was 
recently studied and found to be used 'in the wild' [36]. A 
combination of multiple tracking technologies is also used to track 
even those users who try to opt-out by deleting their cookies, last 
shown by Acar et.al [37]. Methods other than tracking cookies are 
on the rise and not only much more difficult to detect, but also more 
difficult to avoid since they do not rely on information that is stored 
on a user's computer like cookies, but are inherent in browsers and 
HTTP itself [38]. Considering the Snowden revelations, blocking 
online trackers does not prevent those capable of accessing the 
2 See http://www.youradchoices.com/ which refers to 
http://www.aboutads.info/choices/ to opt-out of 120 ad services. 
 
Figure 1: Abstract model of the feedback loop of online tracking 
and profiling 
whole traffic bound to an IP address from compiling it into profile. 
Therefore, a reasonable response may be to not try to limit the 
amount of data available but to increase it, to hide within the noise 
and obfuscate ones traces. While there is considerable research on 
technical details of tracking and blocking, questions remain on how 
successful tracking and profiling works. Especially information on 
how profiles are created and which data is used to build them can 
be used to foster better obfuscation techniques.  
There are first steps of analyzing the information flow for online 
advertisements [39] and the relation between Gmail and ads [40] as 
well as transparency enhancements in the browser itself [41].  The 
authors point out the effects of profiles created for behavioral 
targeting and contribute to a better understanding of how profiling 
works, but they do not use this information to influence the profiles. 
In this paper we will first elaborate on the interest profiles used by 
Google as one of the major participants in this market. And second, 
we want to address the question: How can insights in the actual 
practice of profiling be used to intervene in these processes in a way 
that can offer users transparency about and control over the profiles 
that are created? 
B. Related Work on Obfuscation 
Obfuscation is often referred to as a privacy enhancing 
technology (PET) “which offers a strategy for mitigating the impact 
of the cycle of monitoring, aggregation, analysis, and profiling, 
adding noise to an existing collection of data in order to make the 
collection more ambiguous, confusing, harder to use, and therefore 
less valuable”[16]. With obfuscation profiles are similar to masks 
which allow users to use the internet without being identified. 
Unlike those users that block profiling and are therefore identifiable 
as those who are without a profile3. With the ability to change 
profiles like masks, a user is enabled to interact with a profiling 
based service as if she was somebody else. Therefore, she avoids 
the filter bubble by using multiple filters. By broadening the profile, 
the user increases the possibility of serendipity effects during her 
web research. 
A widely discussed example for those PET is TrackMeNot [17], 
[18], a Firefox plugin that can be used to obfuscate search queries 
on Google. TrackMeNot continuously sends random or dummy 
queries to Google to hide real queries made by a user within this 
noise. In the continuing work the authors focused on enhancing the 
dummy generation strategy to be less obvious so that a search 
provider cannot simply filter out dummy traffic. Users are also 
enabled to narrow the topics about which dummy traffic is 
generated to avoid issuing queries that might not be acceptable in 
some circumstance (e.g. at work). Nevertheless, obfuscation tools 
lack a wide adoption. They require a user to already know about 
profiling and offer no means to see what the obfuscated profiles 
actually look like. 
Besides proposing ways for obfuscation of online tracking as a 
way to strengthening informational privacy by fostering users' 
abilities to decide on how they want to be recognized, we also want 
to address previously identified challenges [16]. The authors ask, 
whether it is possible to quantify and optimize different tactics of 
obfuscation. The approach presented in our paper takes some steps 
in this direction by introducing a mean to measure and improve 
                                                                
3 Which may lead to further assumptions. e.g. when a tracker 
recognizes that a specific browser plugin like ghostery is 
installed, the user can be categorized as privacy aware 
obfuscation effectiveness based on information provided by the 
trackers. This approach can be used for different tactics of 
obfuscation such as 'hiding within noise' to be unrecognizable and 
'masking or impersonating' with a different profile that is in itself 
valid. We do so, not by reverse engineering profile generation, but 
rather by looking at the outcomes of tracking, in particular in how 
the user's input (the web navigation trail) is transformed into an 
interest profile. 
Balsa et al. [22] developed a model to analyze web search 
obfuscation tools. As described above, one key element of 
obfuscation is the “dummy generation strategy” (DGS) that 
generates dummy web traffic – in the case of web search it generates 
dummy search requests to hide regular user requests within a large 
amount of automatically randomized requests. However, an 
attacker who wants to filter out the dummy traffic to build up a 
profile based on the real requests could do this with a profile 
filtering algorithm (PFA). According to Balsa et al. this filtering 
may target two different vulnerabilities. First a profile based 
analysis could identify dummy traffic by comparing a profile that 
includes dummy traffic with regular profiles known to be not 
obfuscated. Dummy traffic that is too broad in a sense that it does 
not reflect a “normal” user behavior e.g. including less frequent 
search terms more than others, might therefore be identified. A 
second strategy referred to as query based analysis may identify 
dummy traffic by elements of the query itself. For example a query 
that includes meta-data that identifies it as automatically generated 
can be easily filtered out. For the presented study we neither tried 
to hide from PFAs nor did we find any evidence that Google has 
implemented any.  
III. STUDYING INTEREST PROFILING BY GOOGLE 
The following study is focused on the analysis of the profiles 
created by Google for advertising purposes. Google advertising and 
tracking services are widely used in practice and Google itself 
offered basic options to control and review the profile it creates (see 
Figure 2) for users that is not logged in to their services and may 
therefore think she is anonymous. 4 To be able to compare the extent 
of tracking and profiling by Google on a larger scale we set up an 
automatic crawling system called SYSTEM-A (see Figure 3Figure 
3). We used SYSTEM-A to first collect profiles from Reddit that 
offer a user created list of URLs and we then used these URLs in an 
automated crawling process to collect information about the amount 
of tracking and the resulting profiles generated when accessing the 
sites. Our main datasets were the user-URL-lists from Reddit, the 
4 Since July 2015 this services is no longer available for users that 
have not registered with google although the profiling is still in 
place. 
interest lists from Google and network logs from the automatic 
browsing. 
A. Reddit User Data 
Since we do not have access to a larger number of browsing 
histories we turned to Reddit. Reddit is an online community that is 
used to share and discuss links posted by users. Lists of links are 
organized in subreddits related to a specific topic where users can 
vote and comment on them. In addition to these community-based 
actions, there are also a number of users who uses the site mainly 
as an individual bookmarking service, posting websites they visited 
unattached to the idea of reaching a broader audience. We used the 
bookmarks of those users as input since we assume that they visited 
these sites at least once and that this link list reflects at least a part 
of the users’ interests when being online. We are aware of the fact, 
that the user base of Reddit does not reflect the general population, 
since it is known to be a relatively young, white, male and English 
speaking community.  Nevertheless, the generalizability of our user 
base is not required since we did not want to study average profiles, 
but interest profiles that can be linked to a single user, regardless of 
the socio-demographic attributes of the users. 
To focus on the bookmarking users we selected a subsample of 
506 users that fulfilled several requirements: 
 Included users who posted at least 60-100 links (to 
exclude inactive users). 100 is the maximum number of 
links provided per user. 
 These 60+ links should point to at least 60 external sites 
(to exclude users who are heavily engaged in Reddit-
internal linking and to exclude those who only use it to be 
up to date with Internet Memes). 
 The links should be diverse in the sense that they should 
point to at least 20 different domains. 
We accessed Reddit through its public API which allows 
automatic analysis. We used the “random post” API to select the 
users and analyzed whether they meet the above listed 
                                                                
5 Accessible on https://support.google.com/ads/answer/2842480 
(last visited 10.11.2015) 
requirements. More than 10.000 profiles had to be processed to get 
the sample of significant size to serve as an input to the crawling 
process of accessing all linked pages. 
B. Google Interests Profiles 
The Google Interest Profile was extracted from the ad-
preferences page (see Figure 2) after a browsing session was 
completed. On this page Google offered users the possibility to 
check what the algorithms think they are interested in. It was 
intended to be used by those that own a Google profile and have 
manually added information to that profile like gender, age and 
could be used also by those users that are not logged in, to check 
which interests are assigned to them by Google's algorithms 
analyzing the searches they did and websites the visited.  
The full list5 of interest are organized in a tree-structure with 
multiple categories. In total the list contains 2042 items from which 
847 are in the category “World Locations” that is not displayed on 
the Google ad settings page. The other 1195 interests are split into 
24 “root” categories with a varying number (up to 6) sub-categories 
such as “People & Society/ Family & Relationships/ Family/ 
Parenting/ Babies & Toddlers/ Baby Care & Hygiene”. We called 
the root categories Google interest categories (GIC). The number of 
subcategories are listed in Table 1 (left column). While some have 
about 150 Subcategories (e.g. Arts & Entertainment) others only 
spread over nine sub-interests (e.g. “Real Estate” or “References”) 
Based on the interests listed on the Google ad settings page we 
defined an interest profile for user (U) as the tuple IPU = (x1, …, xn) 
where xi is 1 if any sub category of interest category GIC i was 
listed. And 0 if no sub-category of interest category i was listed.  
Therefore, we define the breadth of a user's profile as the sum 
of this tuple. 
(1)                     BU = ∑IPU 
C. Browsing Data 
For each user we set up an artificial browsing session. All data 
collection and analysis was carried out using standard tools. 
Multiple Debian/Linux based servers hosted a MongoDB Instance 
and various scripts. Browsing behavior was simulated with the 
 
Figure 3: Basic Elements of the Crawling System SYSTEM-A 
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Figure 2: Googles Ad Settings page showing the interests 
assigned based on user tracking. Available at 
http://www.google.com/settings/ads  
(The page was redesigned July 2015 and is no longer available 
for users that are not logged)  
headless browser PhantomJS6 which surfed the roughly 100 pages 
and waited 1 minute for each page to render all scripts before the 
next page was requested. All HTTP Requests were logged together 
with corresponding cookies and header information. Afterwards the 
profile folder was moved and surfing the next users’ links started 
on a clean profile. 
                                                                
6 We used PhantomJS version 1.9 that was modified to allow 
execution of Flash videos. It was also configured to accept all 
cookies and certificates. 
IV. TRACKING THE TRACKERS 
In the following section we present some descriptive statistics 
about the user base, the amount of tracking and the profiles that 
were generated using SYSTEM-A. Afterwards we will use this 
information as a test-set for SYSTEM-B to evaluate obfuscation 
mechanisms. 
A. User Statistics 
We analyzed the lists of URLs for 506 different users. These 
lists consisted of 96 URLs in average with a standard deviation (s) 
of 13.72. Browsing habits of the users are reflected in the fact that 
these URLs in average linked to 44 different domains (s=14.85). 
The overall dataset contains 45829 links to 7123 different domains. 
As could be expected, the number of links to each domain highly 
varied. The top 100 URLs made up about 49% of all links. Due to 
the nature of Reddit, that is linking to public content not to content 
in closed services, in our data sets the most linked web sites after 
youtube.com and imgur.com were sites covering news such as 
guardian.com, nytimes.com, bbc.co.uk, huffingtonpost.com and 
others. The specifics of the links at Reddit is especially striking 
when compared to the widely recognized Alexa7 Top 500 which 
lists the most visited web sites based on the traffic they produce (for 
a comparison see Table 2).This list is led by search pages (Google, 
yahoo, baidu or live.com) and social networking sites (facebook, 
linkedin and twitter). 
For the purpose of our evaluation the Reddit data set is 
beneficial since news sites often include third party advertisements 
(and tracking) scripts which track a user on multiple sites while for 
example Facebook maintains its own user tracking and 
advertisement service without directly involving third parties. In 
addition, third party advertisement services rely on pseudonymous 
IDs to identify the same user on different web sites and build 
profiles based on the browsing behavior, while services that require 
a login, such as Facebook, can enrich the browsing profiles with 
information entered by the users themselves. 
7 Alexa is a Webanalytics company that regularly publishes a 
widely recognized lists with its own estimates about the most 
visited sites online. The comparison is with the Top-List from 
28.08.2014- See http://www.alexa.com/topsites 
Table 1: Distribution of Google Interest Categories (GIC) 
Interest Category (No. of 
Subcategories) 
Occurrence of any sub-
category in that tree for 
all users 
Arts & Entertainment (147) 80% (318) 
News (21) 67% (265) 
Games (42) 54% (213) 
Law & Government (36) 47% (186) 
Finance (50) 45% (181) 
Computers & Electronics (128) 43% (175) 
Internet & Telecom (34) 43% (172) 
Sports (69) 42% (171) 
Business & Industrial (121) 40% (160) 
People & Society (40) 32% (129) 
Science (25) 26% (105) 
Shopping (71) 24% (96) 
Travel (27) 22% (88) 
Autos & Vehicles (95) 22% (87) 
Food & Drink (73) 21% (83) 
Beauty & Fitness (21) 20% (82) 
Jobs & Education (36) 20% (80) 
Reference (30) 18% (71) 
Online Communities (18) 18% (71) 
Pets & Animals (15) 16% (65) 
Books & Literature (9) 12% (48) 
Home & Garden (48) 12% (46) 
Hobbies & Leisure (30) 6% (23) 
Real Estate (9) 2% (7) 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Profile Breadth. Red line indicates 
average. 
B. Tracking Statistics 
PhantomJS allowed us to log all requests the browser issued. A 
request may be an HTML-page as well as an image or a JavaScript. 
Nowadays JavaScript-Code issues requests to dynamically load 
content into web pages. Looking at the requests is of interest for our 
study because cookies and referrer URLs are part of a standard 
HTTP request and are used to identify a user. For example, if a user 
visits reuters.com and huffpost.com which both implemented 
Google services, for each visit a JavaScript-file is requested from a 
Google server. These requests come along with a cookie and a 
referrer that the Google server can use to make a connection 
between the user id and the two websites. Based on the Google 
search index that analyses the content of web pages, the tracker is 
capable of connecting a topic to the user ID, too. On average 20% 
of all content that constitutes a web page, are requested from 
external servers. This includes advertisements but also images, 
Facebook's “Like” or Twitter's “Tweet”-Buttons, links to Google's 
Translation Service or trusted-shop logos. In our dataset a median 
of 641 different cookies was issued to each user. As described 
above not all cookies are used for tracking purposes. 
When it comes to Google, we identified 15 top level domains 
that can be associated with the company, four are directly related to 
advertisement and user tracking (google-analytics.com, 
doubleclick.[com|net], googlesyndication.com, googleadser 
vices.com) others offer end-user services (google.com, 
youtube.com, youtu.be) or provide script and font files through a 
Content Delivery Network (googleapis.com). The dedicated 
tracking and audience analytic domains are contacted on 75% of an 
average user's links. When looking at all the 15 domains, the 
number increases to about 83% of all page visits that were 
recognized by Google. These results are similar to prior research 
[42] that analyzed each website independently and found Google 
services to be contacted on 88% of the websites. This also shows 
that the Google interest profiles are an appropriate start for 
analyzing the effectiveness of countermeasures. Other third parties 
that are embedded in a large percentage (30-50%) of the URLs of 
each user's list were facebook.com, twitter.com and 
scorecardresearch.com and quantserver.com. 
C. Interest Distribution 
After the browsing process, we crawled the interests assigned 
by Google to each user from the ad preferences page. On average 
each user was assigned 16.34 (s=7.5) interests ranging from 1 to 37 
from the 1195 interests available. To be able to better compare the 
users with each other we looked at the 'google interest root 
categories' (GICs) instead of the interest leaves as described above. 
Users' interest stem from 8.07 (s=3.41) of the 24 GIC (see Figure 
4). Table 1, right column, shows the percentage of occurrences of a 
GIC within the dataset. The distribution is largely comparable to the 
interests one would expect given that the most viewed sites on the 
web are entertainment or news related as listed e.g. on the Alexa 
Toplist. However other high ranked interests like “Games” are 
presumably biased by the sample population. 
D. Limitations 
Online advertisements are not only personalized, but the ad 
space is sold and purchased in a dynamic market referred to as 
programmatic advertisement combined with a strategy called real-
time bidding [43]. This inner-advertisement-economy is used to 
purchase advertisement space on various websites leading to 
websites not knowing which ad publisher will show an ad. For our 
analysis this means that every time a website is visited, another 
tracker might be present and while google might serve the ad on one 
page load, might not do so on the next. It is further possible that 
Google assigns interests not based on the content of the site but 
rather by using a relation to the interests that are known about other 
users of the same site. For example, if user A reads a news article 
about topic 1 that was also read by users B and C. If users B and C 
both own a Google Account which they used in some way to 
express their interest in topic 2, this might lead to topic 2 (and the 
corresponding interest) being assigned to user A as well. In addition 
websites that update their content frequently, like those of large 
news agencies which are prominent in the dataset (theguardian, 
nytimes etc.) lead to a large variety of assigned interests. When we 
evaluated this variance we even recognized that even for pages that 
did not change, the assigned interests were not constant. For 
example, multiple parallel issued requests to the front page of 
wired.com resulted in the interest “Computer and Electronics”, for 
all sessions, but also in up to two other varying interests. 
Furthermore, [39] proofed that Google is not reporting all 
information that is used in a profile on the ad settings page. 
E. Summary of Tracking Analysis 
In this section we showed how SYSTEM-A can be used to 
analyze the extent of tracking by Google services with a focus on 
the interest profiles that are created. Google is able to create a 
profile consisting of 7 basic interests out of 75 percent of websites 
that contact Google's server, mostly without knowledge of the user. 
Nevertheless, there is no predetermined subset of websites that lead 
to a specific interest assignment by Google. This is related both to 
the fact that advertisement spaces are not always filled with ads 
from the same provider, and that external factors may influence 
which interests are assigned (e.g. the order websites are surfed). We 
Table 2: Top linked sites and the corresponding Alexa Rank 
No Domain # Links Alexa Rank 
1 imgur.com 3173 49 
2 youtube.com 2725 3 
3 theguardian.com 1033 134 
4 nytimes.com 854 115 
5 reuters.com 686 297 
6 bbc.co.uk 659 62 
7 washingtonpost.com 587 289 
8 huffingtonpost.com 554 68 
9 en.wikipedia.org 480 6 
10 news.yahoo.com 376 4 
11 flickr.com 372 107 
12 reddit.com 372 50 
 
will therefore use a weighted model to connect interests to websites 
which can serve two purposes. On the one hand it can be used to 
foster transparency about the interests a user might get assigned 
without having to rely on the availability of Google's Ad Settings 
page on the other hand it serves as input for our obfuscation 
mechanism described below. 
V. OBFUSCATION SYSTEM DESIGN 
For now, we learned how profiles look like which can help users 
to understand why a system responds the way it does. In a second 
step use the collected data to make an attempt to mitigate the 
profiling through obfuscation. For SYSTEM-B three dummy 
generating strategies were evaluated primarily to test and to 
compare how well they can obfuscate a GIC-Profile. 
While the first strategy (randomDGS) was designed for the 
purpose of comparison the latter two strategies (static and 
weightedDGS) took into account what we learned from SYSTEM-
A.  
A. (Re-)constructing profiles and anti-profiles 
To obfuscate a profile we first created a ‘real’ profile to be able 
to obfuscate a user regardless of whether or not the profile created 
by google is known. To do this the list of URLs a user has visited 
was evaluated and based on the existing data an interest profile was 
estimated to know which interests are least likely to be part of the 
profile. This anti-profile than served as a basis for the dummy 
generation strategies. For the construction of the ‘real’ profile we 
used the collected data described above to calculate the probabilities 
of a domain leading to a specific interest. We then checked if these 
probabilities can be used to reconstruct the profile for a unknown 
list of URLs. More specifically we:  
1. Calculate the probability P for domain Di supporting on 
of the interests categories GICj by dividing the number 
Ni,j of all co-occurrences of Domain Di and GICj  by the 
number of occurrences of GICj with any Domain  
                                                                
8 The Open Directory Project (http://www.dmoz.org/). 
 (1) P(Di|GICj) =
Ni,j
D×GICj
 
2. Calculate the user profile U with regard to all GIC by 
multiplying the probabilities of all domains in the user's 
list (UD). 
(2) U(GICj) = ∏ P
i∈UD
(Di|GICj) 
We did a 10-fold Cross-Validation to evaluate how successful 
interest profiles can be created based on this strategy. Since Google 
assigned interests binary but we calculated them based on 
probabilities we took the 8 most likely GIC to compare them with 
the GIC assigned by Google. Doing so an average of 5.5 of 8 GIC 
were assigned correctly. While this is not perfect it is good enough 
to build the dummy generation strategies on this since we do not 
need the most likely but the most unlikely GIC for the dummy 
generation strategy. 
We therefore ordered the interests in the self-calculated profile 
and sorted them in reverse order leading to the least likely GIC as a 
basis for the DGS. To then select which websites should be used to 
obfuscate the profile we tested three strategies. 
B. RandomDGS 
The RandomDGS is a simple dummy generation strategy that 
randomly selects URLs from a list and uses them as dummy traffic. 
The OpenDirectoryProject8 was used as the dataset for 
RandomDGS. This set includes more than 4 million URLs which a 
community sorted into an ontology. 
C. StaticDGS 
We created a list of website/interest combinations by surfing 
just to one website and afterwards checked whether an interest was 
assigned or not (direct relation). This list was used to select 25 
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websites, 5 for each of the 5 least likely GIC to be added to the 
original URL-list. 
D. WeightedDGS 
For the weighted dummy generation strategy, we took into 
account the observed interest profiles and used the probabilities for 
a relation between a website and an interest as described in step 1 
(see above) to also select 25 URLs for the 5 least likely GIC. Here 
indirect relations between websites and interests are also considered 
when selecting URLs for obfuscation 
To test the effects of the DGS we used SYSTEM-A again and 
altered the users' domain lists by adding 25 URLs generated by one 
of the DGS. The DGS URLs and the Reddit URLs were added 
alternately between the 80th and 100th URLs resulting in a total of 
around 120 URLs. We then calculated the breadth of the resulting 
interest profiles as described above. The most successful of these 
DGS (staticDGS) was then tested again with 5 URLs for the 10 least 
likely GIC.  
Because of the limitations described in IV.4 we also decided to 
re-run System-A without any changes, since 3 months had passed 
between the initial data collection described in section III and the 
tests of the SYSTEM-B. 
E. Results 
We found that using a DGS that learns from the combination of 
interests and websites is more effective than just adding any random 
website. Moreover, we proved that an observed relation of a website 
visit and an assigned interest (staticDGS) leads to more differences 
in the profile than not directly observed relations between a website 
and an interest (weightedDGS). The aim of obfuscation is that the 
interests based on the websites originally visited by a user are 
hidden in the interests produced by fake site visits. Table 3 shows 
details of different runs. 
The effect of the obfuscation is weakened by the fact that the 
profiles have changed significantly within 3 months without any 
obfuscation strategy at all. The second row (“recrawl”) in Table 3 
shows that, there is a difference between the interests assigned in 
the original crawl and the begging of the test of SYSTEM-B. 
Profiles for the users only had an overlap of 58%. Therefore, there 
is a large variance in the profiles when the same websites are visited 
multiple times. 
All resulted tests of SYSTEM-B resulted in profiles with lower 
breadth but vary in how much the profile was altered. Adding 
random URLs only caused little more difference compared to 
underlying noise measured with the recrawl. A measurable effect 
on the profiles visible for the informed obfuscation strategies. The 
effect of adding 25 URLs that support the 5 least likely interests 
worked similarly for direct and indirect correlations between sites 
and interests. The data therefore supports our hypothesis. The 
weightedDGS causes more interests to be lost (1.78). The 
staticDGS increases the overall breadth of a profile (B=7.6). Since 
for all strategies the resulting profiles are still far from being fully, 
we did an additional test with more URLs to be added to the profile. 
The row labeled StaticDGS (+75) show the results of the staticDGS 
when not 25 but 50 URLs were added that were taken from the 10 
least like GIC. Although the strategy in higher number of new GIC, 
the increase in obfuscation is rather small taking into account that 
in this case 50% of the websites visited are dummy traffic. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Our obfuscation strategies have measurably influenced the 
interest profile created by google. However, the effect of adding 
50% dummy traffic to a web surfing history, even when it is 
targeting at an opposite profile, is not very effective compared to 
the fact that visiting the same sites again 3 months later already 
results in a heavily changed profile. This may be related to the way 
online advertisements are sold (see IV.4). As described above a 
huge amount of websites within our test set was related to news 
websites, since those pages ‘age’ it might be, that the value they 
have to advertisers decreases and therefore do not serve as much 
targeted advertisements or are considered less relevant for an 
interest profile after the three month that passed between our tests. 
There also remain uncertainties related to the fact that the 
profiling algorithms of Google are nontransparent. We do not know 
if Google has a Dummy Classification Algorithm (DCA) or a 
Profile Filtering Algorithm (PFA) in place which could be used to 
mitigate obfuscation. What we do know is that during the time of 
testing they did not use DCA methods comparable to those 
suggested by Balsa et al. [23]. The way that the crawler surfed the 
websites (staying 60 seconds on each page, a modified browser and 
without any interaction) would be filtered out by a query based 
analysis since it is easily distinguishable from more 'real' user 
interaction. Additionally, the chosen URLs that explicitly support 
unlikely interests would be an easy target for a profile based 
analysis. Also because obfuscation tools are still primarily used 
academically, Google can reasonably refrain from modifying their 
targeting until the need arises. Instead, it seems like Google is rather 
“optimistic” about the profiles. It broadens the GIC on low 
confidence data, e.g. if only one site out of a hundred is connected 
to a specific interest. We see this in the higher numbers of “new” 
than “lost” GIC. This is behavior is reasonable for an advertisement 
company as it increases the diversity of people to whom targeted 
ads will be shown. 
One could generally argue that there is no need for obfuscation 
of GICs given that Google is as transparent and unstable in their 
interest assignings. Individuals can add or remove interests via the 
settings page to create a profile that matches whatever he or she 
wants. However, we do neither know whether the personalization 
differentiates between self-stated interests and those that emerge 
out of internal data sets and nor is it clear how long this service will 
be available since this option was recently removed for anonymous 
users.  
Table 3: Comparison of the effects on GIC-profile after adding 
25 and 50 URLs with various DGS. Table shows averages; 
standard deviation in brackets. 
 GIC new lost 
Orig 8.25 (3.53) / / 
Recrawl 7.38 (2.24) 1.29 (1.72) 1.84 (1.32) 
RandomDGS (+25) 7.41 (2.08) 1.90 (1.85) 1.45 (1.36) 
StaticDGS (+25) 7.60 (1.94) 2.29 (1.78) 1.65 (1.48) 
WeightedDGS (+25) 7.31 (2.13) 2.11 (1.62) 1.78 (1.58) 
StaticDGS  (+50) 7,97 (1,77) 2,67 (1,63) 1,64 (1,41) 
 
A. Limitations and Future Work 
Our obfuscation system worked with interests associated with 
domains (instead of pages) so websites with a broader focus (like 
news portals) were not used for obfuscation. An improvement 
would be to identify connections between the content of a web page 
and the interest assigned by Google. In addition, the way the 
profiles were created within several hours does not imitate a human 
browsing pattern. Further improvements on this issue could provide 
more insights into how Google “forgets” interests and whether 
recent websites visits or regular visits have a larger effect on the 
profile. 
Since we used bookmark lists only from reddit to perform the 
profile analysis, the gathered data about the distribution of interests 
is not generalizable. Nevertheless, the information about the extent 
of profiles sees plausible for any number of internet users. In 
addition, the dummy generation strategies presented in this paper 
are independent and could be enhanced by extending the input data. 
Unfortunately, Google removed the possibility to review interest 
profiles of anonymous users during a recent update while the option 
is still available for users with a google account. A future analysis 
therefore has to put extra effort in creating those accounts. 
A further application of the resulting Bayes network could be 
found in using it to find pages that are out of the users focus helping 
them to escape a possible filter bubble. The results of this study can 
be used to e.g. develop an end-user web browser plug-in that not 
only increases transparency and control over existing profiles but 
will also empower users to impersonate a profile, fostering 
information literacy [44]. We are also considering how other 
information like demographic statistics that are commonly used to 
define a target group can be made transparent and controlled. This 
includes data about gender, age, location or income which are also 
provided by tracking services. All of this can be fruitful for 
“revitalizing serendipity” and offering users content that is 
normally hidden or down-ranked due to their browsing behavior. 
VII. SUMMARY 
In this paper we argued that tracking and profiling of users is an 
elementary part of many web services. Profiles are created and used 
in a feedback loop were user actions change the user's profile, which 
changes the way she can interact with a service. Since there is a lack 
of options to opt-out of profiling there is a need for new privacy 
enhancing technologies that allow users to get transparency about 
and influence on their profiles. As part of this research we analyzed 
Google as one of the mayor players in web tracking and profiling 
business. 
We studied the extent of tracking for 506 user profiles extracted 
from Reddit and found out that about 8 basic interests are assigned 
to each user by Google based on about 60 % of the web navigation 
trails the tracker was able to observe. This user-centered analysis is 
– to the knowledge of the author – new and has not been performed 
in a similar way. We then used this data to perform informed 
obfuscation by using different Dummy Generation Strategies 
(DGS) to influence a user's interest profile. We showed that, 
although there is an inherent noise in the profile data, these 
obfuscation strategies are more effective than adding random 
traffic.  
Our study extends the knowledge about the practice of profiling 
users by a large online advertisement company. Gaining insights 
into these practices can increase the autonomy by counteracting the 
effects of services, which increasingly personalize their action 
without the knowledge or consent of users. The results can be used 
to increase transparency about tracking and profiling by offering 
information about what their profile looks like and which websites 
are related to which interest. In addition, the approach of informed 
obfuscation was proven to be more successful in supporting 
strategies to control profiling than randomly strategies that just try 
to hide within noisy data. 
In future work we will evaluate how this data can be used to 
increase the awareness about the effects of online tracking by 
visualizing the profile. The promising results of our informed DGS 
are used to build an obfuscation browser extension to empower 
users to control their profiles in such a way as to be able change or 
extend them based on individual demands. 
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